Introduction
Can labor emigration form part of a state's foreign policy goals? In particular, how do authoritarian states use labor emigration in their foreign policy-making? The emerging academic literature on the politics of international migration has yet to fully explore this phenomenon as a separate field of inquiry. In the case of Egypt, the state developed an emigration policy that subsidized the short-term emigration of high-skilled professionals, who were also loyal supporters of the ruling regime, across the Arab world and Africa.
This goes against existing theorization on states' engagement with emigration in two ways: firstly, states are expected to develop labor emigration policies according to their developmental aims, primarily seeking to accrue migrant remittances; however, the Egyptian case demonstrates how authoritarian states may also be willing to financially support the emigration of high-skilled citizens. Secondly, comparative politics research links emigration in authoritarian contexts to the 'exit' of political dissenters; yet, the case of Egypt highlights how thousands of regime followers were also willing to emigrate abroad in support of the state's foreign policy goals. A closer analysis of 'authoritarian emigration states' is needed in order to fully comprehend the politics of cross-border mobility in non-democratic contexts. This includes the export of Cuban medical staff under the Fidel Castro regime or the dispatch of Russian scientific staff across the Soviet Union. Beyond Cold War politics, China's 'no-strings-attached' development policy currently involves the dispatch of hundreds of thousands of workers, advisors, and technicians employed in aid and construction projects abroad, particularly in Africa.
This article aims to shed light on the motivation of authoritarian emigration states for promoting their citizens' cross-border mobility, in an attempt to move beyond political economy and comparative politics paradigms that dominate the field. I argue that they may employ high-skilled labor emigration as an instrument of soft power towards host states for two distinct foreign policy purposes, namely cultural diplomacy and bilateral aid dissemination. In the case of Egypt under President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954 -1970 , the sending state employed regional emigration of Egyptian professionals as a tool of cultural diplomacy in order to disseminate ideas of anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism, and Egyptian-led pan-Arabism across the Arab world; it also employed emigration as an
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Gerasimos Tsourapas 3 instrument of bilateral aid dissemination, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and in the case of Yemen. In these practices of winning the 'hearts and minds' of Arab and African states' citizens, Egypt came into direct competition with the conservative Arab monarchies that felt threatened by Nasser's popularity and pan-Arab rhetoric, as well as Israel, which was also organizing the dispatch of professionals abroad as an instrument of bilateral aid. Beyond its contribution to the interplay of cross-border mobility and authoritarian states' foreign policy, the article also contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the importance of migration in conflictual intra-Arab relations and the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the interaction of soft and hard power in the broader context of the international relations of the Middle East.
I employ a single-case-study methodology for two reasons: first, it may provide a challenge to existing theoretical paradigms, paving the way for future large-N studies. In this instance, I argue for the foreign policy importance of high-skilled emigration within the context of authoritarian states. In particular, I demonstrate how authoritarian emigration states may engage in high-skilled labor emigration not for regime export but for soft power purposes of cultural diplomacy and bilateral aid dissemination. Despite the pitfalls of selecting cases on the dependent variable, a significant body of political science work highlights how 'in the early stages of a research program, selection on the dependent variable can serve the heuristic purpose of identifying the potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest' (George and Bennett, 2005: 23) . This is the case with Egypt, which constitutes a 'crucial,' albeit not a 'hard' case in terms of its relevance to the article's theoretical construct (Gerring, 2007) , given its historical centrality as the main exporter of migrant labor in the Middle East and one of the largest recipients of remittances globally (Tsourapas, 2015) , as well as its character as an authoritarian state.
Second, the single-case format allows for the presentation of rich data on Egypt, particularly primary accounts that may be cited in full and inductively allow for theory development (George and Bennett, 2005: 111-112) . Two hypotheses emerge based on existing data on the Egyptian historical case: Egyptian professionals' emigration under Nasser served as a political instrument during the intra-Arab competition against
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conservative monarchies (James, 2006; Kerr, 1978; Tsourapas, 2016) ; at the same time, high-skilled emigration formed part of its broader foreign assistance towards the developing world, particularly Yemen (Rahmy, 1981; Schmidt, 1968) . Detailed evidence from primary sources will allow for a reformulation of these initial explanations into more general hypotheses, which may then be tested in a broader set of cases. As George and Bennett argue, 'it is valid to develop a theory from a case and then test the theory against additional evidence from the case that was not used to derive the theory,' as this enhances the theory's falsifiability and 'can circumvent confirmation biases ' (2005: 112) .
With regard to data collection, fieldwork in authoritarian contexts presents unique challenges, particularly in light of the fact that cross-border mobility is traditionally considered a security issue for Arab elites (Tsourapas, 2014) . Research is further plagued by a lack of publicly available statistical data on intra-Arab flows, as well as by the fact that Egyptian migration management is handled at the highest levels of the executive. At the same time, the fact that this is a historical case study hinders the use of elite interviews. In light of an absence of readily available information on state policy or statistical data, I relied upon a meticulous collection of the coverage of Egyptian labor migration issues: I collected all references to issues of emigration in three main Egyptian newspapers (al-Ahram, al-Akhbar, al-Gumhuriya) and a number of other Egyptian sources, which featured fragments of policy analysis or statistical information. I also succeeded in gaining access to archival sources at the Ministry of Education in Cairo, which allowed for a more accurate understanding of the politics of Egyptian educational staff emigration. I sought to neutralize any bias in Egyptian data sources via triangulation with additional Western evidence, namely autobiographies and memoirs, material from the National Archives in London, and various Western media coverage of labor migration in the 1954-1970 period. Given the broader anti-Nasser climate across many Western states during this period, I assigned more weight to evidence drawn from first-hand accounts in instances of discrepancies or contradictions.
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Authoritarian emigration states in international relations
Labor emigration has been mainly examined through political economy and comparative politics analyses, neither of which has linked cross-border mobility to sending states' foreign policy. For political economists, labor emigration policy is shaped by a state's developmental needs, particularly with regard to attracting remittances (Kapur, 2010) .
Although this strand of literature identifies how cross-border mobility features in uneven relations between 'developed (migration receiving) and less-developed (migration sending) countries' (Hollifield, 2012: 366) , it does not incorporate foreign policy matters in its analysis. At the same time, comparative political scientists examining emigration out of authoritarian contexts expect such flows to be dominated by regime dissenters seeking to 'exit' the sending state, rather than regime loyalists that may serve foreign policy purposes abroad (cf. Glasius, 2017) .
That is not to say that the foreign policy component of cross-border migration has been unexamined. Within the subfield of diaspora studies, Gamlen introduced the concept of the 'emigration state' to describe state institutions, practices, and mechanisms 'protruding beyond their borders and impacting on a variety of extra-territorial groups' (Gamlen, 2008; cf. Hollifield, 2004) . At the same time, a growing number of scholars theorize the foreign policy importance of diasporas, along two lines: one group of scholars employ diasporas as their unit of analysis, and theorizes on diasporas' foreign policy repercussions for the sending state (King and Melvin, 2006; Koinova, 2012) ; a second group of scholars focus on the sending state, and how it is able to employ diaspora groups as lobbying instruments (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2008; cf. Shain and Barth, 2003 ).
Yet, states' rationale for their diaspora and labor emigration policies do not overlap (cf. Tsourapas, 2015) : for instance, Israel's diaspora policy towards Jewish Americans that form part of the Israel lobby in the USA does not imply the existence of a particular labor emigration policy. At the same time, there has been little attention paid to whether regime type matters in such policies (Koinova and Tsourapas, 2018 ; for an exception, see Mirilovic, 2016) .
This article presents a new perspective for the analysis of mobility across non-democratic contexts in international relations scholarship, aiming to shift debates beyond state- (Babiracki, 2015) . How can this foreign policy aspect of authoritarian emigration states' actions best be examined?
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In order to address this, I introduce the concept of 'soft power' to the study of migration and diaspora politics, with an empirical focus on the international politics of the Middle East. While a full analysis of the term is beyond the scope of this analysis (cf. Berenksoetter and Williams, 2007) , this article's conceptualization is reminiscent of Lukes' third dimension of power or, as Nye puts it, 'getting others to want the outcomes you want' via co-option rather than coercion (Nye, 2004: 5) . While soft power has yet to be associated with cross-border mobility, I argue that it allows a more accurate analysis of the foreign policy importance of high-skilled emigration for authoritarian states as an instrument of cultural diplomacy via academic and scientific exchanges (Nye, 2004: 44-55) , and facilitating the dissemination of developmental aid (Nye, 2004: 61-62) . In the remainder of the article, I examine how soft power considerations shaped Egyptian labor emigration policy under President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Beyond the interplay between Egyptian foreign and emigration policies, I also identify how soft power is not entirely benign nor detached from hard power in the international politics of the Middle East, as per Nye's original theorization, but is closely associated with both military and economic power (cf. Schmidt, 2007) .
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Emigration and Egyptian soft power under Gamal Abdel Nasser, 1954-1970
How does labor migration feature in Egypt's foreign policy in the 1954-1970 period?
Egyptian emigration before 1970 was tightly regulated (Dessouki, 1982; Tsourapas, 2015) , with the notable exception of the encouragement of regional, short-term emigration of Egyptian professionals. Under the state's secondment program (niẓ am ali'ara li-l-kharij) , thousands of teachers (Table 1) , doctors, nurses, and other professionals were dispatched according to the Nasserite regime's wish to contribute to the development processes of neighboring Arab states. The state also aimed at spreading revolutionary ideas of anti-imperialism and Arab unity, or pan-Arabism, under Nasser's leadership, by applying the regime's dictum that 'we should differentiate between Egypt as a state, and Egypt as a revolution' (cf. James, 2006; Kerr, 1978) . The Egyptian regime developed a number of propaganda instruments to spread revolutionary ideas across the Arab world -the most well-known being the Voice of the Arabs radio programs. That said, very little has yet been written about how short-term, high-skilled emigration complemented its foreign policy goals (cf. Tsourapas, 2016 ).
Egypt's regional foreign policy underwent a number of stages in the aftermath of the 1952 Free Officers' Revolution (Gordon, 1992 ). An initial phase of introspection and pre-occupation with expelling the British gradually gave way to a more cautious, albeit at times openly hostile, attitude towards the West. By the mid-1950s, Nasser was firmly in control of Egypt and empowered by the fortuitous results of the Suez Crisis two years later. He developed an Egypt-centered, pan-Arab rhetoric that combined 'anticolonialism, Arab socialism and the ideal of Arab political union' and reverberated across the Middle East (Dekmejian, 1971: 108-118; James, 2006) . References to al-waḥda al-'arabiyya (Arab Unity) would increase after Egypt's 1958 merger with Syria and the creation of the United Arab Republic (Jankowski, 2002: 27-39) . This rhetoric was widely popular across the Middle East, but Arab masses' enthusiasm for the ideas of Nasserism was not shared by elites in the conservative Arab monarchies. In particular, King Faisal, who in 1964 had replaced his brother Saud on the throne of Saudi Arabia, saw 'Nasser's pan-Arabism as a direct threat to the survival of the Sa'udi ruling group ' (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 113) . This tension between the Arab republics and the Arab monarchies, the so-
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called Arab Cold War (Kerr, 1978) , culminated in Egyptian and Saudi support for opposing sides in the 1962-1970 Yemeni Civil War, which will be described below. 1953-1954 580 1955-1956 1198 1958-1959 2696 1961-1962 2948 1962-1963 3512 1963-1964 4615 Source: Department of Secondment, Ministry of Education, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014 .
In this process of intra-Arab antagonism, the Egyptian regime was able to employ regional migration as an instrument of soft power, partly given the massive developmental needs that the Arab world faced at the time. In the twilight of British colonial rule over the region, there was a heightened need for trained professionals to staff new Arab states' educational and bureaucratic machineries. In fact, in the era of decolonization, 'mass popular education was one of the first tasks which the new governments set themselves' (Hourani, 2013: 389) . Under Nasser, the Egyptian state was able to take advantage of this historical conjuncture. In fact, while labor emigration under Nasser was heavily restricted and regulated through a variety of formal and informal bureaucratic obstacles, regional high-skilled emigration constituted the notable exception to this (Tsourapas, 2016) . This form of migration, particularly of Egyptian educators, was framed in political terms: as alGumhuriya reported, 'Egypt believes that it is her duty to help her sister Arab states to develop their education and learning … and that this development will not be achieved unless Egypt supplies these states with their needs for teachers at any cost ' (al-Gumhuriya, 1957 ).
Very little evidence exists on the nature of the process of selection and training, and even archival material on this is fragmentary (see Table 2 ). Yet one is able to gain a better
Gerasimos Tsourapas 9 understanding through published sources, governmental documents, and various firsthand accounts: Charles Cremeans, for instance, a British teacher working in the Arab world at the time, wrote that Egyptians were 'indoctrinated before going to their foreign posts and are instructed to act as representatives of their country and its policies' (Cremeans, 1963: 41) . Egyptian ministries prepared 'training seminars' to teachers aiming to 'acquaint them with the countries that they will be serving at' and 'to enlighten them' (United Arab Republic, 1964: 5) . Dessouki has also written on how those aiming to be seconded abroad needed to have no criminal record, and to expressly state that they would 'not work with an agency openly hostile to Egypt or its national interest [or] undermine the development goals of Egypt' (1982: 62) .
But why was this a soft power strategy for the Egyptian regime, rather than merely another instance of economically driven labor emigration? For one, this was a very costly process for the Egyptian state: with regard to Egyptian teachers, the Ministry of Education was typically responsible for their salaries while they were abroad (Tsourapas, 2016) . At the same time, as Table 2 demonstrates, host states appeared to be selected on the basis of close relations with Egypt: for instance, the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Jordan or Iraq led to the cancellation of secondment provisions for those countries. More importantly, the short-term emigration of Egyptian professionals, particularly teachers, was allowed despite severe domestic shortages: according to an eyewitness account, 'the export of teachers was a sacrifice to Egyptians … up and down the Nile valley, it is common sight to see Egyptian schoolrooms empty for lack of teachers' (Wynn, 1959: 136) . Numerous reports also point to the heavy politicization of these Egyptians abroad, who would 'take with them the flame of Nasser-type nationalism' (Wynn, 1959: 137) . It is not accidental that the Egyptian state published lists of teachers selected for service abroad in the main newspapers, as an act of valorization (see al- Ahram, 1956 ). The following section examines in detail how this form of migration was aimed at promoting Egyptian cultural diplomacy goals across the region.
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Country
High-skilled emigration and Egyptian cultural diplomacy
Broadly, a strategy of cultural diplomacy developed after 1954, which aimed at disseminating ideas of an Egypt-led Arab unity, anti-colonialism, and anti-Zionism across the Middle East (Barnett, 1998; James, 2006) . This had a number of components: for one, Egypt sponsored radio programs, notably al-Sawt al-'Arab (Voice of the Arabs), which were broadcast across the Middle East and enjoyed enormous popularity. The distribution of Egyptian newspapers abroad was also employed in the context of the Arab Cold War as an instrument of Egyptian propaganda (Kerr, 1978 The presence of Egyptian teachers explains why so many classrooms show the influence of Egyptian propaganda. Pupils do crayon drawings of Egyptian troops winning victories over Israel or Britain. In Benghazi, Libya, a complete course in Egyptian history is given to secondary school students. A display in a high school art exhibit showed pictures of the leading rulers of Egypt; on one side were the 'bad' rulers, on the other the 'good' rulers. The bad rulers began with the Pharaoh Cheops, who enslaved his people to build the pyramids, and ended with Farouk. The good rulers began with the idealistic Pharaoh Ikhnaton and ended with, of course, Gamal Abdel Nasser (Wynn, 1959: 137) .
Nasserite cultural diplomacy across the country was aided by the fact that Libyan schools were using Egyptian textbooks. The seventh-grade textbooks featured a dedicated chapter entitled 'I am an Arab' that stated: 'I am an Arab. Yes, I say it with all pride and happiness. I am not alone. Every Arab is my brother in language, religion, feeling and nationhood… Yes, I am an Arab from Libya' (Obeidi, 1999: 37 (Chalcraft, 2010: 8) .
Similarly, Egyptian teachers in Dubai were involved in attempts to spread Nasserite ideas and foster students' political activism, as 'many young boys were encouraged by senior students and expatriate staff to demonstrate in the streets while carrying banners and photos of Jamal Abdel Nasser' (Davidson, 2008: 41 The tune which welcomed spectators just before the gala began was that of the favourite song of 'Voice of the Arabs. 
High-skilled emigration and Egyptian development aid
The use of high-skilled migration as an instrument of soft power did not rest solely on the dissemination of cultural diplomacy abroad. Across a number of host states, Egyptian migration diplomacy facilitated the dispersal of development aid, either in the form of expertise or in terms of infrastructural support. This is most evident in Egyptian emigration in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly across newly independent African states.
As regime stalwart Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal declared in 1956, 'Egypt must send selected missions of experts in science, religion, politics, economics, commerce and social services to aid the African peoples, to support them, to collaborate with them and light the path before them ' (Haykal, 1956) . Egyptian development aid across Africa had a distinct foreign policy component: firstly, Egypt believed it stood to gain potential support at the United Nations from the newly independent African nations (Cremeans, 1963) ; secondly, and perhaps more importantly, it aimed to battle the involvement of Israel in the continent. In 1965, Nasser wrote the following:
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The struggle of the Asian and African peoples is not waged in isolation from the struggle of the Arab nation. In addition to the responsibilities of the development of the African continent following its liberation call for gigantic efforts so that imperialism should not infiltrate and return to it under the pressure of underdevelopment or behind a deceptive mask, such as the Israeli mask, which imperialism tries actively to make use of in Africa. (Nasser, 1966: 12) In terms of Israel, it was also engaged in a sustained effort to increase its visibility across 
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The day a newly independent African country celebrates its independence, a delegation arrives from Israel bringing with it a deep and detailed study of the problems of the country. While all other delegations are offering their congratulations the Israeli delegation is speaking about the problems [that] the newly independent country faces. Most delegations return home after the celebrations but the African ruler keeps the Israeli envoy because he can discuss postindependence problems with him. … In many cases, an Israeli mission returns bearing with it economic, technical and/or cultural agreements. Israel usually chooses one or two fields and concentrates its activities on these. 
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King Faisal -who saw in this an attempt to destabilize the region and threaten their survival. The conflict in Yemen escalated into a proxy war between Egypt -or, as it was then called, the United Arab Republic -and Saudi Arabia (Dawisha, 1975) . Beyond a heavy military engagement of over 60,000 soldiers, Egypt also organized the short-term emigration of thousands of professionals -teachers, engineers, doctors, nurses, and so on (Figure 2) -to the country. together with 2,000 demonstrators' towards the Saudi Arabia Delegation in Sana'a, where they 'broke into the courtyard and smashed all the windows.' The Imam was forced to issue a formal apology to the Saudi King, saying 'we are Arab brothers and must accept sorrow with good heart' (The National Archives -CO 1015 /1267 , 1959 Egypt's involvement in Yemen highlights not merely the importance of labor emigration as a soft power strategy, but also the degree to which soft power interacted with economic and military power. Dana Adams Schmidt, the New York Times' correspondent, produced a detailed account of the military conflict in Yemen, while also paying particular attention to Egyptian soft power policy:
I was impressed also by the extent of the Egyptians' 'hearts and minds' campaign among the Yemenis [such as] installing water pumps, schoolteaching and providing all kinds of professional services and adviceagricultural, engineering and medical. These were all ways of introducing the Yemenis to modern life, ways in which the Egyptians could do things for the Yemeni people which their traditional leaders could not. The Egyptians had also brought 100 Egyptian ulema [Islamic scholars] into the country, in the hopes of persuading the Yemenis that there were really no important differences between the Sunnis and the Shia in general, and the Shaffei and Zeidi sects in particular. They may even have tried to persuade the Zeidis that they did not really need an Imam. (Schmidt, 1968: 208) 
Conclusion
The novel evidence presented in this article via the case study of Egypt under Nasser allows the reformulation of its initial hypotheses into two broader ones: first, the 
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Israeli use of emigration as a foreign aid component within the context of the ArabIsraeli rivalry is reminiscent of the Cold-War-era competition between the two superpowers over the Third World. Similarly, there exist a number of similarities between intra-Arab rivalry and the competition between China and the USSR over the leadership of the communist world during the Cold War. In all these cases, cross-border mobility has been an important aspect of authoritarian emigration states' foreign policy agendas.
Ultimately, the article aims to contribute to an evolving research agenda on the politics of authoritarian emigration states. Through its inductive exploration of population mobility as part of an authoritarian state's soft power strategies, it aims to bring work on soft power into conversation with research on the international politics of migration, and to shift focus away from the policies of liberal democracies. In this sense, the article aims to draw parallels with ongoing research on the international politics of authoritarian rule, on authoritarian regime export strategies, as well as work on linkage and leverage. In doing so, it is able to shed additional light on key matters in world politics: the rise of China as a global power cannot be disassociated from 'wenhua ruan shili,' or the cultural soft power it pursues in a number of ways, including the dispatch of Chinese teachers to over 500
Confucius Institutes across the world. In the Middle East, the Iranian-Saudi competition also includes a transnational dimension of efforts at exerting religious influence beyond the two states' borders. Similarly, Turkish foreign policy includes a soft power dimension in its emigration diplomacy, as the Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, trains, funds, and dispatches thousands of imams annually to over 2000 mosques abroad.
Future work is needed beyond single-case studies in order to test, and modify, the expectations put forth in this article, and to create a more robust model of the interplay between authoritarian emigration and foreign policy. At the same time, empirical studies may be able to address additional questions raised by this article. For one, how does highskilled emigration fit into the broader range of soft power policies available to authoritarian states? For Nasserite Egypt, high-skilled emigration was only one component of the state's broader soft power agenda; today, China and Turkey combine emigration with a number of other soft power policies, while Cuban strategy appears to focus on the dispatch of medical staff abroad. How effective is high-skilled emigration as 
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